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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of a mechanism that distorts production to-
wards too much use of primary factors like labor and too little use of intermediate inputs.
The distortion results from two ingredients that are cornerstones of modern quantita-
tive trade theory: monopolistic competition and input-output linkages. The distortion
as such is unrelated to trade, but has important consequences for trade policy, includ-
ing a positive first-order welfare effect from an import subsidy. For a crystal-clear view
on the distortion, we first look at it in a single-sector, closed economy where the monop-
olistic competition equilibrium would be efficient without the presence of input-output
linkages. We compare the social-planner-solution with the decentralized market equi-
librium, and we identify first-best policies to correct the distortion. To analyze the trade
policy implications we then extend our analysis to a setting with trade between two sym-
metric countries. We identify first-best cooperative policies, featuring nondiscriminatory
subsidies of intermediate input use, as well as non-cooperative trade policies where coun-
tries use tariffs to weigh terms of trade effects against benefits from correcting the input
distortion.
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1 Introduction
The presence of input-output linkages in an environment with monopolistic competition
may constitute a case for a negative optimal import tariff. This surprising result can be seen
from the numerical analysis in Caliendo et al. (2015) and is shown formally in a limiting case
for a two-sector setting in the revised version of that paper which has appeared as Caliendo
et al. (2017).1 We argue that the mechanism responsible for the result is an input distortion
that arises also in a single-sector setting: markup pricing implies that intermediate material
inputs come at a price above their true opportunity cost. If technology allows for substitution
between primary and intermediate inputs, then production of varieties will involve too much
direct labor use, relative to material inputs (or roundabout use of labor). In such an environ-
ment, an import subsidy generates a positive first-order welfare effect by reducing the cost
of imported intermediates, thus causing substitution towards heavier use of intermediate in-
puts, with the distinct possibility of a negative optimal tariff.
In this paper, we provide an anatomy of this input distortion by means of a detailed com-
parison between the social optimum and the decentralized market equilibrium, and we char-
acterize first best government policies to deal with the distortion in closed economy settings
as well as in a model featuring trade in intermediate inputs.
Since the input distortion is not directly related to trade, we start with a single sector,
closed economy model where the distortion appears in its purest possible form. We distin-
guish between the case where the input distortion arises only in the variable cost, because
the fixed cost uses only labor, and the case where the distortion arises in the fixed cost ac-
tivity as well. In the former case, a decentralized equilibrium features efficient firm-level
employment, but each firm uses too little of the material input. In the latter case, the use
of material input is efficient, but firms use too much labor. In either case the equilibrium
features a suboptimally low degree of roundaboutness in the use of labor. With the input dis-
1Indeed, we were inspired to write this paper by a diagram in Caliendo et al. (2015) depicting welfare as a
function of the import tariff and featuring a negative gradient at the level of a zero tariff, which suggests a negative
optimum tariff.
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tortion restricted to the variable cost, firm entry is efficient. With the distortion present in the
fixed cost activity as well, firm entry is too low, compared to the social optimum. This holds
true regardless of wether we have firm heterogeneity.2
A key feature of input output linkages is that any sector’s output may be used for final con-
sumption as well as for intermediate input use, including intermediate input use in the sec-
tor’s own production. Therefore, the government has two instruments to deal with the input
distortion. It may subsidize the intermediate input use in production of varieties (upstream,
or backward subsidization), which seems like the natural way to address the distortion. Al-
ternatively (or in addition), it may subsidize the use of varieties in production of final goods,
which may in turn be used for final consumption or as an intermediate input (downward,
or forward subsidization). We demonstrate that both instruments are equally suitable as a
first best correction of the input distortion, even if the government cannot discriminate in
downstream subsidization between intermediate input use and final consumption use of the
final good. This latter assumption seems plausible since any such discrimination would likely
prompt arbitrage activities. We also demonstrate that a wage tax cannot deal with the distor-
tion, and we note in passing that the input distortion also arises in wage setting environments
(fair wages or efficiency wages).
In the second part of the paper, we analyze the input distortion in a setting with trade, and
we explore its implications for trade policy. We develop a symmetric two-economy model
where each country produces its own version of an aggregate intermediate input (composed
of its own varieties), which is then used, alongside the imported intermediate input, to as-
semble a non-tradable final good used for final consumption as well as for intermediate input
use in production of each country’s varieties. In this setting, the government may downward-
subsidize the use of its own intermediate or the imported intermediate (negative import tar-
iff), or it may upstream-subsidize the intermediate input use of the final good. Again, we
compare the social optimum with the decentralized equilibrium and then identify coopera-
2This paper offers a brief discussion of firm heterogeneity as an extension to the baseline model. A more
detailed treatment of the input distortion under firm heterogeneity is found in an earlier version of the paper
(Jung and Kohler, 2016).
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tive (first-best) policies for the entire world. These involve a nondiscriminatory downward-
subsidization in each country of both, the domestic and the imported aggregate intermediate
(negative import tariff) in final goods assembly, or an ad-valorem equivalent upstream sub-
sidization of each country’s intermediate input use of the final good. In a policy regime that
bans domestic subsidies, the government is left with downstream subsidization of the im-
ported intermediate. Such a subsidy introduces a policy distortion of its own in that it favors
the domestic over the foreign intermediate, without any underlying distortion (as the input
distortion is present in both), but we find that the optimal second best-policy is a negative
import tariff.
Finally, we address non-cooperative policies in either of the two countries, assuming a
policy regime that bans domestic subsidies, leaving only pure trade policies to maximize na-
tional welfare. The novel element in this non-cooperative policy calculus is the familiar terms
of trade effect which, in and of itself, calls for a positive import tariff. This, however, aggra-
vates the input distortion which must be weighed against the benefit from a terms of trade
improvement. We demonstrate that each country has an incentive to deviate from the co-
operative policy equilibrium by lowering its import subsidy. Taking free trade as a reference
point, we find that the terms of trade incentive dominates if the “Armington elasticity” is small
enough and the strength of the input-output linkage (measured as the output elasticity with
respect to the materíal input) is small enough, and vice versa. The optimal tariff is lower in
the presence of the input-output linkage than without.
The importance of these results derives from the widespread use of monopolistic com-
petition models in economics. In trade theory, this was sparked off by Krugman (1979,1980)
and Ethier (1982) and reinforced by Melitz (2003).3 The relevance of input-output linkages
in such models was first noticed by Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996) who
emphasize the potential of such linkages to cause (multiple) agglomeration equilibria. In
large scale computational trade models, input-output linkages have always loomed large and
3Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) have popularized the use of monopolistic competition models in new Keyne-
sian macroeconomics. A third area of widespread use of such models is endogenous growth theory, sparked off
by Romer (1990).
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many such models also feature monopolistic competition; see, e.g., Keuschnigg and Kohler
(1996), Balistreri et al. (2011) and Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014).4 However, in these
strands of literature the presence of the above input distortion has gone unnoticed.5
We discuss the consequences of the input distortion for optimal policies. Costinot et
al. (2020) also compare decentralized equilibrium to social optimum in order to characterize
optimal unilateral policies in models with monopolistic competition. However, they neither
consider input-output linkages nor cooperative policies. Lashkaripour and Lugovsky (2021)
analyze optimal unilateral policy in a generalized multi-industry Krugman (1980) model. In
an extension, they discuss the implications of input-output linkages for optimal policies, but
they do not pay attention to the underlying distortions. In Caliendo et al. (2021), the au-
thors provide an in-depth characterization of optimal trade policy in a two-sector small open
economy with roundabout production and monopolistic competition. Our setting features
two large countries and a broader set of policy instruments, which allows us to characterize
cooperative (first-best) policies.6
As mentioned above, the input distortion as such is not directly related to trade. To fa-
cilitate a deeper understanding, we therefore start out by analyzing the input distortion in a
closed economy setting. In particular, we compare our results to what we know from exist-
ing literature about the efficiency properties of a monopolistic competition equilibrium. A
cornerstone of that knowledge is that in a single sector world with a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) in demand, the decentralized laissez faire equilibrium is efficient. The reason
is that with standard CES preferences, “consumer surplus” and “profit destruction” distor-
tions exactly cancel out, as noted by Baldwin (2005). Moreover, provided that all firms charge
the same markup consumers’ spending decisions across firms are not distorted. Importantly,
4The general importance of input-output linkages for trade policy effects was highlighted in Caliendo and
Parro (2015), although that paper does not feature monopolistic competition.
5To be clear, this does not, per se, invalidate the results that such models generate regarding the positive and
normative consequences of specific trade liberalization scenarios. But awareness of the above type of production
inefficiency and the corresponding mechanisms should contribute to a full understanding of the welfare results
obtained.
6There is a literature emphasizing the isomorphism between monopolistic competition models and Ricardian
models with external economies of scale (Kucheryavyy et al., 2016). Bartelme et al. (2019) discuss optimal policies
in a Ricardian model with external economies of scale.
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in Melitz-type models with firm heterogeneity the efficiency-result also applies to the equi-
librium mass of firm entry into the market and to the selection of firms taking up production
(Dhingra and Morrow, 2019). However, efficiency is lost if the degree of external economies
from product variety differs from the degree implicit in standard CES models, or if the elastic-
ity of substitution in demand is variable; see Benassy (1996,1998) and Dhingra and Morrow
(2019). Production efficiency is also lost in multi-sector models with CES preferences, as in-
dicated above. Generally, industries with above average markups of prices over marginal cost
will produce in less than optimal amounts; see Epifani and Gancia (2011) for a framework
with constant markups and Behrens et al. (2018) for a model that features variable markups.
The purpose of using a single sector, closed economy setup in the first part of our paper is
to place the input distortion in a modeling environment where the monopolistic competi-
tion equilibrium is fully efficient, provided there are no input-output linkages. This allows
for a crystal-clear view on the mechanism through which the input-output linkage causes a
production distortion.
It is important to be clear about what we mean by an input-output linkage. In general
terms, what we mean is the production of commodities by means of commodities, that is,
goods serving as inputs in their own production, alongside primary inputs such as labor.
The element of circularity is crucial here, and it separates input-output linkages from pure
fragmentation of production, or multi-stage production. With pure fragmentation, the tech-
nology of production is recursive, meaning that along the value added chain no good is ever
used, directly or indirectly, as an input in its own production. In this case, market power of
intermediate input suppliers may lead to multiple markups in prices of intermediates and,
thus, to a final goods price which is above its marginal cost, but this does not constitute a
production distortion if markups are uniform, or – equivalently – if there is only one sector
in the economy. In contrast, as we shall see below, input-output linkages generate an input
distortion also in a single sector economy.
In a similar vein, pure multi-stage production does not involve roundaboutness in the use
of primary inputs as input-output linkages do – even with a single stage of production. With
input substitution, input-output linkages raise the issue of the optimal degree of roundabout-
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ness in the use of primary inputs, and monopolistic competition lead to a less than optimal
degree of roundaboutness, as emphasized above. 7 Thus, the input distortion is a potentially
important but hitherto unnoticed case of resource misallocation; see Jones (2013).
The paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the baseline model of a single
sector, closed economy featuring the key ingredients of the input distortion, viz. an input-
output linkage in a monopolistic competition environment. We first derive the social opti-
mum to be compared in detail with a decentralized market equilibrium, with and without
first-best policy intervention. In Section three, we extend our model to a trading environ-
ment involving two symmetric countries, each producing an aggregate intermediate input,
composed of its own varieties, which is traded across countries. Each country assembles its
own as well as the imported aggregate intermediate to a final good used for consumption as
well as a material input into production of its own varieties. For this setting, we analyse first-
best cooperative policies as well as non-cooperative trade policies where tariffs are used as
second-best instruments. Section four concludes.
2 Input distortion in a closed-economy
We use a highly stylized model adopting features familiar from the literature in all aspects
except input-output linkages. To bring the mechanisms of our input distortion into sharp
focus, we begin with the simplest possible case of a closed economy producing a single ag-
gregate good in quantityQwhich may be used for final consumptionC or as a material input
7There is a long tradition in the literature, dating back to von Böhm-Bawerk, of discussing roundaboutness
in the context of capital theory, where roundaboutness involves the lapse of time, which becomes key if individ-
uals have time preference. See Hennings, K.H. (1987), “Capital as a Factor of Production,” in: Palgrave Macmil-
lan (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, London; and Hennings, K.H. (1987),
Roundabout Methods of Production, in: Palgrave Macmillan (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
Palgrave Macmillan, London. This paper, however, is intended as a contribution, not to this literature, but – first
and foremost – to modern trade literature where input-output linkages have played an important role which is
more or less orthogonal to its role in growth theory. Awareness of the issue of optimal roundaboutness in the
trade literature has emerged only recently; see Antràs and Chor (2021) and Caliendo et al. (2021).
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in amount M . We write welfare as
U (C) = C = Q−M, (1)
where U is a quasi-concave utility function. The material input M is used in production of
differentiated varieties which are, in turn, used in assembly of the aggregate good Q. We
assume a constant elasticity of subtitution σ between different varieties in production of Q:
Q = Nν+1q, (2)
where N denotes the number of symmetric firms, each producing its variety in amount q.
This formulation implies love of variety (number of firms), measured by the parameter ν.
Writing σ = 1/(1 − ρ), with ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have σ > 1 and ν = 1/ρ > 1. Firm-level production









where ` measures the representative firm’s labor input and m denotes the level of its material
input. We have M = Nm. The technological parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] measures the strength of
the input-output linkage; without any such link we have γ = 1. In addition to these variable
inputs, each firm must incur a fixed cost f . In our baseline case we assume f to ge given in
terms of labor, but we shall subsequently also consider the case where f is given in terms of
the aggregate good. We assume a labor force of given size L, whence the resource constraint
of the economy is
L ≥ N (`+ f) . (4)
In the decentralized market equilibrium analyzed below, we shall assume that firms act in a
market environment of monopolistic competition. But we first explore the social optimum
to establish a due reference point for our input distortion.
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2.1 Social optimum
Society faces two trade-offs. The first relates to the roundaboutness of labor use. Increas-
ing m/` economizes on labor in production of differentiated goods intermediates, but it also
reduces the amount of output available for consumption. The second is the trade-off be-
tween variety and efficiency: Increasing the number of differentiated varieties increases out-
put even for a constant intermediate input use, but at the same time it reduces output avail-
able for consumption on account of the fixed cost. Assuming strict equality in the resource
constraint, the social optimum lies in the solution of the following problem:
max
`,m,N
Nν+1q −Nq s.t. L = N (`+ f) , (5)
where q is given by Eq. (3). Using ∗ to indicate optimal values, the first-order conditions for `∗
and m∗ are








In (6), λ∗ denotes the shadow value of labor (Lagrangian multiplier). Note that the conditions
on the two types of inputs are similar, but that optimal material input level m∗ does not de-
pend on the shadow value of labor. The reason is that the opportunity cost of intermediate
input use in production is foregone consumption of the same good. Note also that equation
(7) implies M∗ = N∗m∗ = (1− γ)Q∗, which ensures viability (Q∗ > M∗).8
The first-order condition onN∗ is (ν+1) (N∗)ν q∗−m∗ = λ∗(`∗+f), which may be written
8In input-output analysis, this viability condition is known as the Hawkins-Simon condition. Writing the
vector of final consumption quantities as c and assuming a Leontief-technology with input coefficients collected
in a Matrix A, the Hawkins-Simon condition imposes a restriction on A guaranteeing that there exists a vector
x, such that (I − A)x ≥ 0. In our context, Q is the equivalent of Ix, aggregate (gross) output, while M is the
equivalent of Ax, the inputs needed to generate x. Obviously, in terms of the present notation, the Hawkins-
Simon condition is equivalent toQ−M > 0. In input-output analysis, the coefficients A are given exogenously. In
our single sector case, the intermediate input intensity of production is chosen endogenously, and the equivalent
of the Hawkins-Simon condition holds from the first-order condition on intermediate input use.
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as
(ν + 1)Q∗ −M∗ = λ∗L. (8)
This condition simply states that the value deriving from additional net output obtained from
a marginal increase of N must be equal to the marginal cost of N , which is equal to λ∗L/N .
Note that this cost includes variable and fixed labor input into production. Finally, the deriva-
tive with respect to the Lagrange multiplier λ yields the resource constraint in (5).
Using these first-order conditions, we may now solve for the optimal levels of `∗, m∗, N∗,








Given M∗ = (1− γ)Q∗, the condition (8) may be rewritten as
(ν + γ)Q∗ = λ∗N∗(`∗ + f). (10)






Intuitively, the variable labor use relative to labor required for the fixed cost is increasing γ
and falling in ν, the degree of economies from product variety.







As is common in the literature, we ignore the integer constraint on N . Assuming N∗ > 1
implies the parameter restriction L/f > γ/ν + 1 = γ(σ − 1) + 1. Compared to the standard
model without input-output linkages (γ = 1), for any degree of scale economies ν, the input-
output linkage increases the efficient number of firms. Intuitively, since production of any
variety now draws on intermediate inputs as well as labor, a given “endowment ratio” L/f
9
allows for a larger number of production facilities (varieties).
Using the first-order condition onm∗, replacingQ∗ = N∗ν+1q∗, using the production func-






















The term (1−γ)f/ν in an intuitive way mirrors (11) for optimal variable labor use. In addition,
comparing the second term in (13) to (12), we recognize that the optimal intermediate input
use per firm is also increasing in the number of firms. This essentially reflects the resource
constraint of the economy. A higher number of firms implies a higher use of labor for fixed
cost.







For the case of an exogenous firm-number N̄ , this ratio changes accordingly. Equating this to













Remember that this is expressed in terms of consumption. Intuitively, it increases with the
ratio of L/f , due to aggregate economies of scale from the number of varieties of inputs in
final good assembly. The parameter restriction L/f > γ/ν + 1 now implies that λ∗ > 1, which
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also holds for an exogenous number of firms N̄ .
It is instructive to investigate the degree of roundaboutness in the social optimum. We
do this for the case where N is endogenous. We use A∗` := `
∗N∗/Q∗ to denote the direct
labor input coefficient in the variable cost part of production and accordingly for the direct
material input coefficient, A∗m := m
∗N∗/Q∗ = 1 − γ. Adding indirect material input use,
the total material input coefficient may be written as A∗m (1−A∗m)
−1 = (1 − γ)/γ. The labor
embodied in total material input is A∗` (1 − γ)/γ, hence the ratio (1 − γ)/γ gives the ratio
between direct and indirect labor use, looking only at variable inputs. From (11), the fixed
labor input per unit of the aggregate good is fN∗/Q∗ = (ν/γ) `∗N∗/Q∗ = (ν/γ)A∗` , which
is all direct labor use. A useful measure of roundaboutness is the ratio of indirect labor use,






which lies between zero and one.9 Remember that ν > 1 measures the degree of economies
from product variety. A high value of ν means that it is economical to have many firms. But
with many firms more of the overall labor endowment must be devoted to the fixed input,
which does not involve any roundaboutness but only direct labor use. HenceR∗ decreases in
ν.
Finally, the level of welfare (consumption) in the social optimum may be derived as fol-
lows. First, we have C∗ = γQ∗ = γ(N∗)ν+1q∗. Since m∗ = `∗λ∗(1 − γ)/γ, we may write
q∗ = (`∗/γ)(λ∗)1−γ , whence C∗ = γQ∗ = `∗(N∗)ν+1(λ∗)1−γ . Using λ∗ = (N∗)ν/γ from above




















9Alternatively, we might measure roundaboutness as the ratio between indirect and direct labor use, inclusive
of the fixed labor input: [(1− γ)/γ]/ (1 + ν/γ) = (1− γ)/(1 + ν), which lies between zero and infinity.
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Consumption per capita is lower than the marginal shadow value of labor, as expected in a
situation with (exogenously) increasing returns to scale (ν > 1). This is reinforced by the
input output linkage (γ < 1). For later reference, we also note that total factor productivity








which follows from C∗ = γQ∗.
The following proposition summarizes the role the input-output linkages play in the so-
cial optimum.
Proposition 1 (a) For a given ratio L/f , consumption per capita is a constant. Any increase
in L/f leads to an over-proportional increase in per capita consumption (ν/γ > 1). (b) An
increase in L/f also raises the shadow value of labor; in elasticity terms, this relationship is
reinforced by the input-output linkage. (c) An increase in L/f lowers the labor intensity `∗/m∗,
but the optimal degree of roundaboutness in production, measured by the ratio of indirect to
total use of labor, is given parametrically by 1−γ1+ν . (d) The level of consumption per capita is
below the marginal shadow value of labor, and this discrepancy is reinforced by the input-
output linkage.
Proof. Part (a) follows from (17). Part (b) follows from (15). Part (c) follows from (14) and (15)
as well as 16). And (d) follows writing (17 as C∗ = γγ+νλ
∗L.
In the present setup, γ is a primitive of the technology and not subject to policy influence.
It is nevertheless instructive to explore how a change in technology, say a strengthening of
the input-output linkage, represented by a reduction in γ, affects maximum consumption per
capita. Equation (17) seems to suggest that the relationship between the strength of input-
output linkages and the maximum level of consumption per capita, C∗/L, is ambiguous. A
reduction in γ has two opposing effects. First, it lowers the share of aggregate output available
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for consumption, and secondly, it raises aggregate output. The first effect follows directly





which in turn follows from equations (11) through (13) above. It turns out that under the
above mentioned parameter restriction the first effect always dominates:
Proposition 2 In the social optimum, a reduction in γ (which implies a higher roundabout-
ness of labor use) leads to an increase in the level of consumption per capita.


















Given the parameter restriction discussed in connection with N∗ subsequent to equation





Why should a higher intermediate input intensity of production (lower γ) lead to a higher
level of aggregate output Q∗, as evidenced by equations (20) and (12)? Intuitively, a lower
γ saves on direct labor use in production of varieties, thus freeing up labor for fixed input
use. Due to economies from enhanced variety, the indirect labor requirement for production
of the additional intermediate inputs (in line with a lower γ) is lower than the incipient re-
duction in the direct use of labor. If the initial number of firms were equal to one, then the
percentage increase in aggregate output would be exactly equal to the percentage reduction
in direct labor use. But if N∗ > 1, then the percentage increase in aggregate output is less
than the percentage savings on direct labor use per initial variety produced. By implication,
a higher degree of roundaboutness in production is a source of welfare increase.
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2.2 Decentralized equilibrium with policy intervention
We now characterize a decentralized market equilibrium, in which producers of varieties be-
have under monopolistic competition, while assembly of the final good is governed by perfect
competition. Writing p̃ for the “demand-price” for a differentiated variety faced by final good
producers, the minimum unit-cost function dual to (2) is N−ν p̃. Using P̃ to denote the price
of the final good, zero profits in final goods production implies
P̃ = N−ν p̃. (21)







Given what we said in the introduction about the input distortion, it is useful to introduce
a policy instrument that might correct this distortion. In this setup, there are two types of
instruments that lend themselves for dealing with the input distortion. The first is an ad-
valorem subsidy for material input use in variety production, such that the input price that
variety producers face is (1 + s) P̃ . In the following we use θ := 1 + s. A subsidy implies θ < 1,
if θ > 1 this means material input use is taxed. The second policy instrument is a subsidy of
differentiated varieties used in assembly of the final good. This introduces a wedge between
the price p set by producers of varieties and the “demand-price” p̃ faced by producers of the
final good, such that p = p̃/(1 + t). In the following, we write τ := 1/(1 + t), where a subsidy
implies τ > 1. If τ < 1 this means the use of varieties is taxed. We emphasize that τ applies
to the entire production of the composite good, including production for final consumption
where there is no distortion. Hence, at first sight τ seems an unlikely candidate for a first best
correction of the distortion. However, we shall see that in the present setup the two types
policy instruments, θ and τ , are isomorphic.






and given demand as in equation (22), Bertrand pricing of variety producers yields








q and m = (1− γ) x
θP̃
q. (24)
Free entry into the market for varieties implies zero profits, (µ− 1)xq = fw, which leads to












Comparing this with equation (11), and noting that µ − 1 = ν, we recognize that the decen-
tralized equilibrium features a first-best level of direct labor use per firm. Notice the different
contexts in which the two terms µ− 1 and ν are placed. When describing the first best in the
previous section, we have used ν = 1/ (σ − 1) as a measure of economies from the number
of input varieties available for assembly of the aggregate good. Here, µ − 1 = 1/(σ − 1) addi-
tionally captures the degree of market power enjoyed by variety producers. The equilibrium









Comparing with (12), we find that the decentralized equilibrium also features a first-best
number of firms.
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Applying the logic of roundaboutness in production developed above, we use (24) to write
Am = Nm/Q as





Nν = (1− γ) θµ
τ
,





. The ratio of indirect to direct labor use





γ + θµτ − 1
. (31)
If θµ/τ > 1, as in the laissez-faire case (θ = 1 and τ = 1) or with θ = τ , the decentralized
equilibrium features a lower than socially optimal degree of roundaboutness in production.
The total labor input per firm, inclusive of the fixed part, is equal to `(1 +ν/γ), as in the social
optimum. The ratio of indirect to total labor use (inclusive of the fixed labor input), taking on








Obviously, if Am(1−Am)−1 is lower than in the social optimum, then R < R∗ as well.
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which we may compare to the shadow value of labor in the social planner’s solution. From








λ∗. If θµ/τ > 1, as in the laissez-faire
case (θ = 1 and τ = 1) or with θ = τ , then the relative price of labor lies below the shadow
value of labor.
We may summarize our results on the decentralized equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 3 (a) A decentralized laissez-faire equilibrium is characterized by a socially opti-
mal level of employment in each firm as well as by an optimal number of firms in the market.
(b) Compared to the social optimum, the material input use is lower than in the social opti-
mum, and so is the degree of roundaboutness in production, causing an aggregate output loss
as well as a consumption (welfare) loss. (c) In a subsidy/tax-ridden equilibrium the socially op-
timal level of consumption per capita is reached if the policy-wedges are such that τ/θ = µ > 1.
Proof. (a) The first-best nature of ` as well asN is evidenced by equations (26) and (27) above.
(b) Comparing (30) with equation (13), and setting τ = θ = 1 (laissez faire), we find that
m/m∗ = µ−1/γ = [σ/(σ − 1)]−1/γ < 1. As regards roundaboutness in production, see our
remarks on (32) above. Similarly, inserting the above equations for `, N andm (setting τ = θ =
1) into the equation for Q, and comparing with Q∗ in (20) above, gives Q/Q∗ = µ−(1−γ)/γ =
[σ/(σ − 1)](1−γ)/γ < 1. Finally, real consumption is C = Q −M = (1 −M/Q)Q, where M =

















For τ = θ = 1, we have 0 < C/C∗ < 1. Note that for a given size of the labor force C also
serves as a welfare measure. (c) For a subsidy/tax-ridden equilibrium, τ 6= 1 and θ 6= 1, it
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Legend: The curves depict the loss in total factor productivity (TFP) and consumption caused by the input distor-
tion as a function of the labor cost share γ for different values of the elasticity of substitution.
is immediately obvious from (34) that τ/θ = µ is a sufficient condition for C = C∗. A more
thorough examination requires maximization of (34) with respect to τ/θ. It can be shown that
the condition τ/θ = µ is also a necessary condition.
What is the magnitude of the welfare loss caused by the input distortion, absent any pol-
icy? The loss is measured by the ratio C/C∗ in (34). For θ = τ = 1, we have C/C∗ =
[(1− 1/µ+ γ/µ)/γ]µ−(1−γ)/γ < 0. We are also interested in the loss in total factor produc-
tivity which is simply measured by Q/Q∗ = µ−(1−γ)/γ . Figure 1 depicts these losses for values
of γ ∈ [0.5, 1], and for values of σ ∈ {5, 10}.10 The losses are substantial, ranging, up to 4
percent for welfare and up to 20 percent for TFP.
Remember that τ > 1 (τ < 1) means subsidizing (taxing) production of differentiated
goods, while θ < 1 (θ > 1) means subsidizing (taxing) the intermediate input use of the
aggregate good. Hence, the optimal policy requires that the combined effect of the two types
of policy amounts to net-subsidization at a rate equal to µ, which is the markup rate. This is
as expected, since it is precisely this markup which is behind the input distortion. Moreover,
it is unsurprising that subsidizing intermediate input use should be a first-best instrument to
10In the appendix, we show that the share of intermediate inputs in gross output is between 40 and 60 percent.
In an undistorted world, this share would reflect 1− γ.
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correct the input distortion. What is remarkable, however, is that the two types of policies
considered here are equally suitable as a first-best correction of this distortion. Specifically,
subsidizing production of differentiated goods, is an equally suitable first-best policy. After
all, this policy effectively subsidizes production of the aggregate good irrespective of whether
such production takes place for intermediate input use, or for final consumption, whereas
the distortion is present only in intermediate input use.
Two things are important to understand this result. First, given perfect competition in ag-
gregate goods production, subsidization of varieties used in assembly fully feeds into a lower
price of this good. And secondly, while this lower price applies to both production and con-
sumption (which is not distorted to start with), it does not distort consumption since by as-
sumption all labor income is spent on this good. Moreover, we have implicitly assumed that
the revenue needed to finance the subsidy is raised in a lump-sum (i.e., non-distortionary)
way. One might wonder about the subsidy bill in the above analysis. The reason why this
bill never showed up simply has to do with the fact that we did not approach consumption
from the income side of the household sector. Instead, we have identified real consumption
directly as what is left from aggregate output after taking account of intermediate input use.
What is the trade-off behind the optimal policy τ/θ = µ? Consider a rise in τ/θ. This has






increases the share of aggregate output Q devoted to intermediate input use, thus lowering
the share available for consumption. But secondly, it also increases the level of aggregate
output, due toQ = [τ/(θµ)](1−γ)/γ Q∗. Thus, we have two opposing forces emanating from the
policy instrument τ/θ, and τ/θ = µ ensures an optimal trade-off between these two forces.
The industrial economists’s immediate response to upstream markup pricing is vertical
integration. It should be obvious that this is not a viable solution to our input distortion.
There simply is no single material input supplier that the variety producer could possibly
identify for vertical integration. Material inputs are bought on perfectly competitive markets.
Moreover, the input-output linkage implies that it is the variety producer’s own markup pric-
ing which is at the heart of the problem.
19
2.3 Wage tax and wage setting
In the decentralized equilibrium, the material input intensity of variety production is gov-
erned by the price of the aggregate good relative to the wage rate; see equation (28). It is
tempting to argue that a wage tax might be an equally suitable policy instrument to correct
the input distortion. In a similar vein, one might argue that a wage setting environment lead-
ing to a wage that lies above the opportunity cost constitutes an offsetting distortion, mitigat-
ing the need for policy intervention or potentially even calling for a tax, rather than a subsidy
on material input. It turns out that in our single-sector setting both arguments, while plausi-
ble in partial equilibrium, are wrong in general equilibrium.
Suppose that the government introduces an ad-valorem wage tax φ generating a wedge
between w, the wage earned by workers, and w̃, the price for labor paid by variety producers:
w̃ = (1 + φ)w. (35)
With homogeneous labor, it seems reasonable to assume that that wage tax is uniformly im-
posed on variable and fixed labor input. A uniform wage tax does not distort the allocation
between the variable and fixed type of labor use and, therefore, also does not distort the num-





equilibrium, i.e., for a given price of the aggregate good P̃ , the wage tax clearly is an incentive
to increase the material input intensity of production. Moreover, it is an incentive to increase
output per firm according to q = (µ− 1)−1w̃f/x.
General equilibrium requires that we close the price-loop implied by the input-output
linkage. A one percent increase in 1 + φ in creases the minimum unit cost x as well as prices
p and p̃ by γ percent. This follows from technology and markup pricing for varieties. Zero
profits in assembly of the aggregate good then imply that the price of the aggregate good
similarly increases by γ percent; see equation (21). Formally, the general equilibrium price









Comparing this with (29), we see that the relative price of the two inputs for variety produc-
tion is invariant to the wage tax. So are the ratios x/w̃ and x/P̃ and, hence, input demands as
well as outputs and the number of firms; see equations (24), (25) and (27). Put simply, in this
model a wage tax doesn’t entail any distortion.
We may summarize this result as follows:
Proposition 4 (a) In our single-sector economy, a wage tax does not constitute a distortion and
is, therefore, not suited to address the input distortion generated by monopolistic competition
in the presence of an input-output linkage. (b) In an economy with monopolistic competition
in the presence of an input-output linkage, an input distortion arises regardless of the under-
lying wage setting mechanism.
Proof. Part (a) follows from the text above. Part (b) follows from considering alternative wage
setting mechanisms (e.g., fair wages, efficiency wages, search and matching, or trade union
wages) as deviations from the reference case of a perfect labor market. These deviations are
isomorphic to the wage tax φ above.
The intuition for this proposition is that with the input-output linkage and the price loop
a wage tax doesn’t affect any decision margin. We must, however, emphasize two caveats. The
first is that we have assumed a completely inelastic labor supply. With elastic labor supply, a
decision margin (e.g., consumption-leisure) arises which is affected by a wage tax as well as
by wage setting mechanisms. The second is that our model has but one sector. In contrast
to the input distortion, the entry distortion that arises in multi-sector settings interacts with
wage setting mechanisms. One might also wonder about tax revenue, or the rents generated
by wage setting. As with the subsidy instruments considered above, the reason why we need
not consider tax revenue here is that in our approach we do not treat consumption from the
income side of the household sector. Instead, we identify real consumption directly as what
is left from aggregate output after taking account of intermediate input use.
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2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Fixed input in terms of the final good
In the above model, input-output linkages are restricted to the variable input part of pro-
duction activities. From an empirical perspective, in many cases technology is such that in-
termediate inputs also loom large in the fixed input activities. We now develop a version of
the model where the fixed input into production requires f quantities of the composite good
rather than f units of labor. Except for this modification, the model remains as in the baseline
case above.
Social optimum. The social planner maximizes C = Q −M by choosing `, m, and N , as
above, but the resource constraint now reads as L ≤ N`, whereas the total material input (in
terms of the composite good) in production of varieties is M = N (m+ f) . The correspond-
ing Lagrangian reads as
£ = Q−M − λ [N`− L] . (37)








The condition on N∗ reads as
(ν + 1)Q∗ −M∗ = λ∗L, (39)
where M∗ now contains total use of the composite good in variable and fixed input into pro-
duction. The resource constraint requires `∗ = L/N∗.
Employing the production function in the condition on m∗, using relative input demand,
and observing the resource constraint, we may see that the Lagrange parameter emerges as





Using the condition on m∗ in the condition on N∗, we obtain
(ν + γ)Q∗ = fN∗ + λ∗L. (41)
Using the condition on `∗ and using the resource constraint to get rid of Q∗ and N∗ in the




























Finally, we check the parameter restriction implied by viability, Q∗ ≥ N∗ (m∗ + f). Using










Employing the solution for m∗, we may rewrite this as γ ≥ ν.
Decentralized equilibrium with policy intervention. While conditional demands of the fi-
nal good producer and the price of the composite good are the same as in the baseline case,








Using this expression to substitute out firm size from conditional demands for material input























Allocational efficiency and optimal policy. In this version of the model, material input is
efficient, while in the absence of policy intervention (τ = θ = 1), labor input is inefficiently
large and – by implication – the number of firms is inefficiently low. As in the baseline, the
optimal policy to offset this input distortion is
τ
θ
= µ > 1. (49)
We now explore this implications for roundaboutness of production. The direct labor in-









The combined material input, Amp +Amf , requires further material input use in the amount
of Amp(Amp + Amf ). Reiterating, we obtain a total material input use per unit of final output
equal to (Amp+Amf )(1−Amp)−1. Note thatAmp+Amf requires no further (indirect) material
input use on account of the fixed cost. The indirect labor use (embodies in material inputs)
is A`(Amp + Amf )(1 − Amp)−1. For easier writing, we now measure roundaboutness by the
indirect labor use relative to the direct labor use. This measure is
R1 = (Amp +Amf )(1−Amp)−1. (51)
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mp = ν, which results in
R∗1 =
1− γ + ν
γ
. (52)
In the decentralized equilibrium without policy intervention, we haveAmp = A∗mp/µ and thus
A∗mf = A
∗
mf/µ. Summing up, we obtain
R1 =
1− γ + ν
(µ− 1) + γ
< R∗1 (53)
In the decentralized equilibrium the degree of roundaboutness is too small, as in the baseline
case.
We can also quantify the implications for total factor productivity and consumption. With









where (N/N∗)ν+1 < 1 and (`/`∗)γ > 1 reflect the effects of, respectively, an inefficiently small




Compared to the baseline above, the TFP discrepancy is larger.11







The distortion in the share of the composite output used as material input is the same as in
the baseline. Hence, the larger discrepancy in TFP compared to the baseline directly trans-
lated into a larger discrepancy in real consumption.






We may summarize the result of this extension in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 If the input-output linkage affects the fixed cost on the same footing as it does
the variable inputs, then the decentralized market equilibrium has the following properties,
compared to the social optimum: (a) The equilibrium level of material inputs is undistorted,
relative to the social optimum, but the labor input is inefficiently large. As in the baseline case,
the degree of roundaboutness is suboptimally low. (b) The equilibrium number of firms is no
longer undistorted, but is suboptimally low. (c) The welfare loss caused by the input distortion
is now larger than in the baseline case; so is the loss in terms of total factor productivity.
Proof. All parts follow from the text above.
Part (a) of the proposition is intuitive. The distortion works in the same direction re-
garding the input intensity as in the baseline case, but this time due to an inefficiently large
amount of labor, rather than too little material input use. Part (b) implies a new channel
through which the input distortion causes inefficiency, viz. the number of firms. Intuitively,
this leads to a larger welfare loss, relative to the benchmark case. Figure 2 shows that the loss
is now very large indeed, with a maximum value of almost 40 percent in the case where σ = 5.
Note that a lower σ implies a high variety effect, meaning that the loss in the number of firms
is now felt more strongly in welfare terms.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous firms










Let productivities be distributed according to the cumulative density function G(ϕ). With
heterogeneous firms, real consumption is given by













m (ϕ) g (ϕ) dG(ϕ) (58)
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Legend: The curves depict the loss in total factor productivity (TFP) and consumption caused by the input distor-
tion as a function of the labor cost share γ for different values of the elasticity of substitution when the fixed input
requires the final good.
where N now denotes the mass of entrants and ϕc denotes the cutoff productivity level. The
following observations stand out from equation (58):
1. For a given mass of entrants N and a given productivity cutoff ϕc, the first term is in-
creasing in l (ϕ). It is disciplined, however, by the resource constraint of the primary
factor (labor), i.e., (i) for a given cutoff ϕc, a higher l (ϕ) implies a lower N , and (ii) for a
given N , a higher l (ϕ) implies a higher cutoff ϕc.
2. Material input m (ϕ) can be changed independently of labor input l (ϕ) . The corre-
sponding “resource constraint” is M ≤ Q, but m (ϕ) is not directly bound by the re-
source constraint of the primary factor (labor).
3. For given N and ϕc, the first term rises in m (ϕ) (higher output), while the second falls
in m (ϕ) (higher material input).
These observations imply that the planner’s real consumption maximization problem can
be decomposed into two stages. In the first stage, aggregate output Q is maximized for given
{m (ϕ)} . In the second stage, the planner finds {m (ϕ)} that maximizes real consumption C
for given N , ϕc, and {l (ϕ)}. The market, however, maximizes aggregate revenue for given
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{m (ϕ)} in the first stage. In the second stage, material input is chosen to minimize firms’


















Consider the first stage. Dhingra and Morrow (2019) show that for given {m (ϕ)}, the mar-








u (q (ϕ)) dG (ϕ) s.t. resource constraint (optimum).
With CES, we have u (q (ϕ)) = q (ϕ)
σ−1
σ and u′ (q (ϕ)) q = ρq (ϕ)
σ−1
σ . Revenue maximization
is perfectly aligned with welfare maximization such that the mass of entrants N , the entry
cutoff ϕc, and variable labor input per firm {l (ϕ)} are efficient.
Turn now to the second stage. As the mass of entrants N and the cutoff ϕc are efficient,
markup pricing is the only source of distortion of the price of the aggregate good. Hence,
firms use too little material input, as in the case of homogeneous firms. Again, a subsidy
on the purchase of intermediate inputs that exactly offsets the mark-up yields the efficient
allocation of material input.
3 Country borders and trade costs
We assume two countries, home (h) and foreign (f ), producing large numbers Nh and Nf ,
respectively, of differentiated goods, which symmetrically enter production of a composite
(or aggregate) good according to a CES production function with an (Armington) elasticity of
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)1/ρi = Nνi+1i qi, i ∈ {h, f} (60)
Yi = Yii + δYij , i, j ∈ {h, f}, i 6= j, (61)
Qi =
(




, i, j ∈ {h, f}, i 6= j. (62)
In these equations, Qi is the quantity of the final good produced in country i, while Yi is
the quantity of a country-specific aggregate good, assembled from Ni varieties produced in
country i, and used in amount Yii for country i’s own final good assembly. The remainder
is available for the final good assembly in country j, albeit subject to an iceberg-type trade
cost δ > 1. The parameter ρi ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of substitution between different
varieties produced in country i, related to the elasticity of substitution σi > 1 according to
ρi = (σi − 1)/σi. It is also inversely related to the strength of economies from enhanced
variety, measured by νi = 1/ (σi − 1) > 1. The final good is produced according to a CES
technology using the two country-specific aggregate goods as inputs (pure assembly) with an
elasticity of substitution σ > 1 (Armington elasticity), related to the parameter ρ according
to ρ = (σ − 1)/σ and assumed the same for both countries. Importantly, Qi may be used for
consumption in country i or as a material input in production of country i’s varieties qi.
We now explore how two symmetric countries set their policies if they are separated by
borders. Symmetry allows us to drop the country indices i and j. To simplify further, we also
set ρ appearing in Eq. (62) equal to ρi and ρj in Eq. (60), so that the elasticities of of substitu-
tion between varieties in production of the two country-specific aggregate intermediates and
the elasticity of substitution in assembly of intermediates to the final good are all the same.
We discuss optimal cooperative and non-cooperative policies. In doing so, we focus on the
baseline-case where input-output linkages are restricted to variable input use.
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3.1 Cooperative policies
The presence of borders gives rise to two additional margins. First, the aggregate output lev-
els, equal to Y for each country, have to be distributed among the two countries for produc-
tion of the nontrable final goods. We write Y and Ym for conditional domestic and import
demand, respectively. Second, the government may now subsidize the use of the domesti-
cally produced and the imported country-specific aggregates differently by τd and τm. Due to
the symmetry assumption, we suppress the country indices. We have to bear in mind, how-
ever, that L and N now refer symmetrically to endowments and the number of firms at the
country level, reflecting immobility of labor across countries.
3.1.1 Full set of policies
We assume that the governments have all policy instruments τd, τm, and θ at their disposal.
As in Section 3, we proceed by first identifying the social optimum for a cooperative world
and then comparing this with a decentralized equilibrium with policy interventions.










subject to the production functions in (Eq. (60)) and the resource constraint for each country.
The number 2 appears in this expression since we deal with two symmetric countries. Com-
pared to the baseline, there is a new margin: the optimal choice of the imported quantity Ym.
In the statement of the maximization problem, we already impose the goods market clearing
condition. The corresponding Lagrangian is
£ = ((Y − δYm)ρ + Y ρm)
1
ρ −Nm− λ [N (`+ f)− L] . (64)
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and m∗ = (1− γ) Γ
∗Y ∗
N∗






The first-order condition for imports Y ∗m is
− ρ (Y ∗ − δY ∗m)
ρ−1 δ + ρ (Y ∗m)








Invoking goods market clearing, Y = Yd + δYm, relative import demand for intermediate




Intuitively, trade costs drive a wegde between import and domestic demand. Using equation










Hence, the conditions on `∗ and m∗ in equation (65) collapse to their counterparts in the
closed economy; see (6) and (7).
The first-order condition on N∗ is Γ∗(ν + 1)N∗q∗ = λ∗(`∗ + f). Multiplying with N∗ and
observing the resource constraint, this may be written as
Γ∗ (ν + 1)Y ∗ −N∗m∗ = λ∗L. (69)
Using the conditions on m∗ and `∗ to substitute out m∗ and λ∗, respectively, from equation
12The term (Q/Yd)1−δ is the marginal productivity of the domestic input. By virtue of (66), in the social op-
timum the marginal productivity of the imported input is δ times (Q/Yd)1−δ, whence the equation above is an
instance of Euler’s theorem.
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Thus, in the social optimum the variable labor input into production of a differentiated vari-
ety is not affected by the presence of borders. Employing the resource constraint, the optimal








This expression is structurally equivalent to the one obtained in the closed economy above,
the difference being, of course, thatL now refers to a single country’s labor endowment, while
in the closed economy equilibrium L represents world labor endowments.
Using again the first-order condition on m∗ to substitute out m∗ from equation (69) and






where, in constrast to the baseline, N∗ refers to the number of firms in one of the countries.
The term Γ
1
γ appears because a relaxation of the resource constraint not only affects con-
sumption through the domestic, but also through the imported country-specific intermedi-


























In the absence of trade costs (δ = 1), Γ collapses to 2ν , and the Lagrange parameter reads
as λ∗ = (2N∗)
ν
γ , which is in line with the closed economy equilibrium above. In general,
however, the Lagrange multiplier is decreasing in trade costs.












where Y ∗ = (N∗)ν+1 q∗. In the absence of trade costs (δ = 1), aggregate output isQ∗ = 2νY ∗ >
2Y ∗. The inequality is a consequence of external economies of scale. With scale economies,
restricting labor mobility results in lower aggregate output, even in the absence trade costs.



















It immediately follows from the condition on m∗ and equation (68) that the share of output
used as input into production of differentiated varieties is equal to M∗/Q∗ = 1 − γ, as in the
reference case of the closed economy. Hence, consumption is C∗ = γQ∗.
Decentralized equilibrium with policy intervention. In a decentralized equilibrium, con-
ditional demands for inputs at the level of the differentiated good producers are the same
as the basic setting; see equation (24). Moreover, their pricing behavior and the zero profit
condition are the same, giving rise to the following solution in decentralized equilibrium; see

















We stick to the above notation, using a p̃ for the “demand price” for varieties and P̃ to the
price of the aggregate good received by producers.
The new margin is that final good producers have to combine the two country-specific










where, on top of trade costs, the relative policies drive a wedge between the cost of the two
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The first term is exactly the same as in the closed economy equilibrium. The second term
highlights the effects of the trade costs and relative policies. In the absence of trade costs
(δ = 1) and policy differentials (τd = τm), it collapses to (2N)
ν
γ . For a given policy differential
τd/τm, the relative price of labor is decreasing in trade costs.













































in order to faciliate easy comparison to Q∗in (74) above. In the absence of policy differentials




Y , which resembles equation (74).






































Q∗, as in the
reference case. Again employing the production functions and using conditional input de-
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mands for ` and m, the share of output used as input into production emerges as
M
Q













In the absence of policy differentials, the share collapses to (1− γ) τdθµ , again as in the baseline.
Consumption is given by C = Q(1−M/Q).
Comparing the decentralized equilibrium to the social optimum, two observations stand
out. First, the allocation of the country-specific aggregate to markets Ym/Yd is optimal if the
government does not condition the subsidy on the country of origin: τd = τm. Second, condi-
tional on τd = τm, the decentralized equilibrium replicates social optimum if the government
subsidizes either the use of the country-specific aggregates in the production of the final good
or the use of the final good in the production of differentiated varieties to offset the markup.
The following proposition straightforwardly generalizes Proposition 3 to the case of borders.
Proposition 6 (a) In a cooperative setting with borders and symmetric countries, a decen-
tralized laissez-faire equilibrium is characterized by a socially optimal level of employment in
each firm as well as by an optimal number of firms in each market. (b) Compared to the social
optimum, the material input use is lower than in the social optimum, causing an aggregate
output loss as well as a consumption (welfare) loss. (c) In a subsidy/tax-ridden equilibrium
the socially optimal level of consumption per capita is reached if the policy-wedges are such
that τdθ = µ and τd = τm.
Proof. (a) The first-best nature of ` and N follow from comparing (76) to (70) and (71). Fol-















. (c) A sufficient condition for C = C∗ is
τd
θ = µ and τd = τm.
An important corollary to part (c) of the proposition is that trade costs do not affect opti-
mal policies.
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3.1.2 Restriction to trade policy
We continue to assume that the two symmetric countries set their policies cooperatively, but
now we suppose that they are restricted to the use of trade policy measures, while domestic
subsidies are not available.13 With cooperation, the terms-of-trade externality is internalized.
While in the standard two-country, single-sector CES setting, free trade is optimal, in our
setting with an input-output linkages, cooperative trade policy might be used as a second-
best instrument to address the input distortion. The intuition is the following. An import
subsidy lowers the price of the imported country-specific aggregate, and this reduction is
partly passed on to the price of composite good, which, in turn, alleviates the input distortion.
However, the import subsidy causes a distortion in and of itself, raising the relative price of the
imported aggregate intermediate, relative to the domestic intermediate. We now determine
the optimal level of this second-best policy instrument.
To formalize the argument, we consider a setting in which governments take the behavior
of all types of firms and τd = θ = 1 as given and cooperatively choose τm to maximize con-
sumption C = Q −M . For the sake of clear argument, we abstract from trade costs, setting












The effect of an import subsidy on aggregate output is ambiguous. Totally differentiating the





















13The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures disciplines the use of production subsidies.
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Hence, a small import subsidy (τm > 1) raises aggregate output.
Employing the production functions and using the expressions for labor and material in-









It is easy to check that the share of output used as material input into production is increasing
in the import subsidy. By implication, the import subsidy (larger τm) lowers the share of out-
put available for consumption. To demonstrate that the net effect a small import subsidy on









σ (τm − 1) + 1 + τσm(
1 + τσ−1m
)2 τσ−1m1− 1−γµ 1+τσm1+τσ−1m < 0. (87)









2 (µ− 1 + γ)
> 0. (88)
Thus, a small import subsidy imposed by each country is welfare enhancing. Intuitively, the
effect of a small import subsidy on consumption becomes negligible when either γ → 1 or
µ→ 1 (ρ→ 1). Recall that in the standard of cooperative policy formation without the input-
output linkage, free trade is optimal.
We may summarize our result as follows:
Proposition 7 In a world of cooperative policy formation, a small import subsidy imposed by
each country serves as a second-best policy to address the input distortion generated by monop-
olistic competition in the presence of an input-output linkage.
Proof. See equation (88).
Figure 3 illustrates the welfare maximizing cooperative import subsidies |t| = 1 − 1/τm
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Figure 3: Optimal cooperative import subsidy in the absence of domestic policies
The graph shows the optimal cooperative import subsidy |t| = 1 − 1/τm in the absence of domestic policies
(τd = θ = 1). ρ = (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0.5, 1) is a transformation of the elasticity of substitution. γ ∈ (0, 1) is labor cost
share in production.
in (ρ, γ)-space.14 The smaller the labor cost share γ and/or the elasticity of substitution (or:
ρ), the larger the optimal cooperative import subsidy. For σ = 5 (ρ = 0.8) and γ = 0.5, the
optimal cooperative import subsidy amounts to 7.4 percent.
We can also quantify the welfare consequences of prohibiting the use of domestic policies.

















Figure 4 illustrates the TFP and and consumption discrepancies as a function of γ for
σ = 5, evaluated at the optimal cooperative import subsidy. Compared to the situation with-
out any policy intervention, the use of an optimal cooperative import subsidy has only small
effects on the discrepancies. For γ = 0.5, optimally subsidizing imports shrinks the consump-
tion and TFP loss induced by the input distortion, respectively, from 4 to 3.4 percent and from
20 to 17 percent.
14The optimal cooperative import subsidy is determined by the first-order condition of the welfare maximiza-
tion problem: ∂C
∂τm
= 0. In order to compute the policy-induced change in consumption, we employ equations
(84) and (87).
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Figure 4: Discrepancies with and without optimal cooperative import subsidies
optimal import subsidy
no policy intervention


















Legend: The curves depict the loss in total factor productivity (TFP) and welfare caused by the input distortion
as a function of the labor cost share γ for different values of the elasticity of substitution. The solid line refers to
a situation without policy intervention, the dashed line to a situation in which the optimal cooperative import
subsidy is employed.
3.2 Non-cooperative policies
By non-cooperative policies we mean a national government pursuing maximum welfare us-
ing trade policy, and assuming that the other government keeps its policy unchanged. It
proves convenient to reintroduce country indices first introduced at the beginning of this
Section. In our analysis, we abstract from subsidies on the use of the final good (setting
θh = θf = 1) and focus on policy wedges in the prices of differentiated varieties. We first char-
acterize a decentralized equilibrium with asymmetric policies and then analyze the home
country’s incentive to deviate (i) from the cooperative subsidy of varieties and (ii) from free
trade. The new mechanism arising in this context is the familiar terms of trade effect. In
pursuit of a beneficial terms of trade effect, the home government would impose a tariff on
imported varieties. However, in raising the price of material inputs, this aggravates the input
distortion. Hence an optimal non-cooperative policy weighs the input distortion against the
terms of trade distortion.
The price of a variety produced in country i and used in country j inclusive of trade costs
and the policy wedge emerges as
p̃ij = δij (1 + tij) pi, (90)
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where tij > 0 implies a tax and tij < 0 implies a subsidy.15 Proposition 6 implies that in
this kind of setting, the optimal cooperative policy is setting 1 + tij = µ−1 < 1 for all countries
i ∈ {h, f} and j ∈ {h, f} ,which is a uniform subsidy on domestically produced and imported
varieties. Without loss of generality, we take country h’s perspective, define t̄ := thh = tff =
thf , and assume that country h chooses its trade policy tfh non-cooperatively.16
3.2.1 Decentralized equilibrium with asymmetric policy intervention




Nj [δji (1 + tji) pj ]
1−σ
 11−σ , (91)
where domestic trade costs are normalized to unity, δii = 1. Extending equation (22), unit-
demand for varieties follow as
qji =
(




It is useful to focus on the cost share of country j′s varieties in country i′s assembly of the
final good
λji :=




As will become clear below, the term λii, i ∈ {h, f} takes the role of the domestic expenditure
share in Arkolakis et al. (2012). Following this notation will facilitate an easy interpretation of
our results below.
Balanced trade in differentiated varieties requires Nfδfhqfhpf = Nhδhfqhfph, where ex-
ports and imports are inclusive of real trade costs δ, but exclusive of policy wedges t. Using
optimal demands (92) and employing equation (93), the balanced-trade-condition emerges
15For the sake of simplicity, we cast the analysis in terms of t, rather than τ := 1/ (1 + t) as above.
16We could also explore deviation in terms of the domestic policy tii, i ∈ {h, f}. In the light of footnote 13 and









where P̃iQi is the value of output county i’s finalo good. The final good is used by consumers
and by differentiated good producers. Consumers spend their labor income wiLi net of the
lump-sum transfer Ti on the final good, while differentiated goods producers spend a share
(1− γ) /µ of their revenues Zi := Nipiqi on material inputs. Remember that in our baseline
case there are no input-output linkages in the fixed cost part of the technology. Zero profits
imply that they pay out the rest of their revenues to the workers whence
















where the last expression follows from employing equation (93). Note that for a subsidy Ti <
0. The value of output is equal in value to consumption demand (wiLi + Ti) and material
input demand:











Using this expression to substitute out the value of aggregate output and using symmetry in




















where we have used λji = 1− λii.
Using the markup pricing rule and the minimum unit cost function, equation (93) implies
the following relationship between the relative price of labor (the real wage) and the share of
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γ(σ−1) , where χ̄i := N
−1
i [µ (1 + tii)]
σ−1 . (99)
We know from above that the number of firms in any country is independent of policy wedges
tij and we rule out changes in domestic policies tii, whence we can treat χ̄i as a constant in
the subsequent analysis. Moreover, symmetry in country characteristics and domestic policy
allows us to write χ̄ := χ̄h = χ̄f .












In the absence of input-output linkages, this expression collapses to the relative wage ω. In
their presence, relative marginal costs additionally depend on the prices of the final good,
which, in turn, depend on prices of domestic and imported differentiated varieties, whence
the presence of λh := λhh and λf := λff in the above expression.
Using equation (91) to substitute out the price of final good from equation (93), letting
t̄ := thh = tff = thf and using t to denote country h’s trade policy, the equilibrium values of


























where relative marginal costs x are a function of the relative wage and the domestic shares;
see equation (100).
We are now ready to explore any one country’s incentive to deviate from a cooperative
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policy. For the sake of concreteness we look at country h.17 Recall that households’s aggre-










= ζh × (χ̄hλh)
− 1
γ(σ−1) , where ζh = 1 + κ
t̄λh + t (1− λh + t̄)
1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh
(103)
where country h’s income multiplier follows from using equation (96). This expression is a
straightforward generalization of the welfare formula presented by Arkolakis et al (2012). In
the absence of policy intervention (t = t̄ = 0), the income multiplier collapses to unity. Real
income is then determined by the (endogenously determined) domestic cost share, the trade
elasticity (σ − 1), and with the labor cost share γ. For a given domestic cost share λh, a given
trade elasticity (σ − 1), and a given χ̄h, real income is larger in the presence of input-output
linkages (γ < 1) than without such linkages. With policy intervention, welfare is multiplied
by the policy multiplier, as noted by Felbermayr et al. (2015). Note that this multiplier is less
than one if the policy is a subsidy. In the following, we explore the welfare consequences of a
deviation of $t$ implications of a.
The non-cooperative policy analysis now requires that we partially differentiate equation
(103) with respect to t, taking into account the effect on λh as determined by the system (101),











17Analogous expressions also emerge for country f . Without loss of generality, we explore country h’s incentive






(1 + t̄+ (t− t̄)λh)
[
(t̄− t) ∂λh∂t + (1− λh + t̄)
]
(1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh)2
−κ
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1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh
dt. (108)
Intuitively, the expressions for the changes in the domestic cost shares are similar for the
two countries. They differ as a change in t directly affects country h’s domestic cost share,
while country f ’s domestic cost is only affected through general equilibrium adjustments in
the country h’s domestic cost share and the relative wage. Given import (and thus domestic)
cost shares, a change in t directly affects the relative wage. In order to back out the general
equilibrium adjustment in the relative wage, we have to take into account the changes in the
cost shares.
3.2.2 Deviation from equilibrium with unrestricted cooperative policy formation
We now explore whether country h has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative policy
equilibrium. As countries are symmetric in the initial equilibrium, we can suppress country
indices and write λ := λh = λf . Evaluated at the cooperative policy equilibrium t̄ = −1/σ,
the policy-induced changes in the income multiplier and the domestic cost share in country
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γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
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where the first line follows from equation (105) and the second from solving the system of
equations (106) to (108), which requires somewhat tedious but straightforward calculus. With
t = t̄, the income multiplier reduces to ζh = 1 + κt̄. Collecting terms, evaluated at the coop-









γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ λ
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
> 0, (109)
where the inequality follows from 1−λ < 1. Thus, lowering the import subsidy (an increase in
t) raises country h’s welfare. Given the underlying symmetry, this generalizes to the following
proposition:
Proposition 8 Each country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from a first-best coopera-
tive policy by lowering its subsidy on imported varieties.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (109).
The result reflects the standard terms-of-trade externality. Deviation from the first-best
cooperative policy does not exhibit a first-order welfare effect from the input distortion, be-
cause that is perfectly corrected at the outset. It can be shown that the welfare change in-
duced by an increase in t starting from t = t̄ = −1/σ is decreasing in λ (in trade costs δ) and
in γ. The incentive to deviate from the first-best cooperative policy is larger when trade costs
are low. This finding is in line with result that without input-output linkages, the optimal
non-cooperative tariff is decreasing in real trade costs. In the presence of prohibitively high
trade costs (λ → 1), the terms-of-trade effect does not materialize. The incentive to deviate
is also larger when when input-output linkages are stronger. As pointed out above, this is not
the result of the input distortion, because the distortion is corrected at the outset, but of the
sheer presence of input-output linkages.
3.2.3 Deviation from free trade
We now explore the implications of the input distortion for the optimal conduct of trade pol-
icy. As standard in the optimal trade policy literature, we use free trade as the benchmark,
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although free trade is not an optimal policy, given the input distortion. More specifically, we
explore the non-cooperative trade policy incentive in a laissez faire situation. Formally, this
means we set t̄ = 0. We consider the effects of marginal changes in t starting from a symmet-
ric equilibrium with t = t̄ = 0 and characterize the optimal trade policy in turn.
Intuitively, the policy multiplier simplifies to ζh = 1 at t = 0. Evaluated at the symmetric











= (σ − 1) (1− λ)
1−γ
γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
> 0, (111)
where the first line again follows from equation (105) and the second line follwos from solving










γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
]
. (112)
At a symmetric free trade equilibrium with zero trade costs (δ = 1), the domestic cost share is











(1− λ) (2µ− 1)
2γ [µ− (1− γ)]
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In the presence of input-output linkages and the absence of trade costs, the introduction of
an import tariff is welfare enhancing, if and only if the labor cost share is suffiently large: γ >




σ+1 . When the labor cost share is smaller than this threshold, the optimal
policy is an import subsidy. With γ = γ̃, there is no incentive to deviate from the symmetric
free trade equilibrium. Note that in the limiting case σ → 1, γ̃ → 0.5. Thus, in the empirically
relevant cases with γ > 0.5, an import subsidy will never be optimal. Nevertheless, we can
conclude that in the presence of an input distortion, the optimal import tariff will be lower
than without. We will return to the characterization of the optimal trade policy below.
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γ (1− λ) + 1 + (σ − 1)λ
> 0, (114)
where the inequality follows from noting that dλh/dt > 0; see equation (111). The terms-of-
trade improvement constitutes a first-order welfare effect. Two effects potentially run counter
to this terms-of-trade improvement. First, as in the standard model, a deviation of t from t̄










This consumption distortion distortion vanishes if t = t̄, in which case a marginal change in
t does not cause a first-order welfare loss. Second, trade policy affects the input distortion.













An increase in t raises λh, thus lowering relative material input and causing a first-order wel-
fare loss. Clearly, this channel only materializes if γ < 1. Intuitively, our result implies that,
absent trade costs, the input distortion dominates the standard terms-of-trade effect, if the
labor cost share is sufficiently small, and vice versa.
Things change if there are real trade costs, δ > 1. To explore this change, we start out
observing that for δ = 1 we have λ = 0.5. Then, the ratio in equation (112) is equal to 0.5.














18The result also holds in the presence of trade costs.
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This implies that in the knife-edge case where costless trade renders free trade optimal, the
introduction of trade costs creates an incentive to impose a tariff. The tariff incenentive is
decreasing in the elasticity of substitution σ and increasing in the labor cost share γ. The
intuition is that in the presence of trade costs, the response in the domestic cost share λh to a
marginal change in t is smaller than in their absence. The welfare cost of a tariff deriving from
the consumption distortion thus weighs less heavily in the welfare calculus. This same logic
further implies that the parameter restriction on γ for the optimal policy to call for an import
subsidy becomes more binding. Put simply, with trade costs a small deviation γ < 1/ (σ + 1)
still calls for an import tariff.
We may summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 9 (a) Given a laissez faire equilibrium, each country faces (i) an incentive to im-
pose a small tariff when γ > 1/(σ+1), and (ii) an incentive to introduce a small import subsidy
when γ < 1/(σ+ 1). (iii) With γ = 1/(σ+ 1), no country faces an incentive to deviate from free
trade. (b) In a neighborhood of γ-values around the knife-edge case of a zero deviation incen-
tive from laissez faire without trade cost, the presence of trade cost generates a tariff incentive,
but this discrepancy is falling in the elasticity of substitution σ and increasing in the labor cost
share γ.
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) follow from, respectively, equations (113) and (117).
Finally, we characterize the optimal non-cooperative trade policy t∗. The first-order con-
dition of the non-cooperative welfare maximization problem is dWh/dt = 0. Evaluating the
changes in the income multiplier, the domestic cost shares, and the relative wage in equa-
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tions (105) and (108) at t̄ = 0, this first-order condition emerges as
0 =
1− λh 1−γµ














γ (σ − 1)

× (σ − 1) (1− λh)
1 + t
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where each country’s domestic cost share depends on coutry h’s trade policy. The system of
equilibrium conditions in equation (101) together with the first order condition in equation
(118) characterize country h’s optimal trade policy. Since this system defies analytic solution,
we use numerical methods to describe interesting features of the solution.
Figure 5 displays the optimal trade policy as function of γ for different levels of the elastic-
ity of substitution (different panels) and trade costs. In line with Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), we set σ = 5 and σ = 10 (top panels). We also set σ = 2 (lower panel) as Feenstra et
al. (2018) document Armington elasticities lower than 2. With respect to real trade costs, we
consider their absence (δ = 1, solid line) and alternatively set δ = 1.6 (dashed line), in line
with Bernard et al. (2007).
The critical labor cost shares amount to γ̃ = 1/(σ + 1), in line with part (a) of proposition
9. An increase in trade costs increases the range for which an import tariff is optimal, which
generalizes part (b) of proposition 9 to discrete changes in trade costs.
In the absence of input-output linkages (γ = 1), the optimal non-cooperative tariff is
decreasing in real trade costs. This result is well-known from Gros (1987) and Felbermayr et
al. (2013). Two observations stand out. First, for suffiently weak input-output linkages, the
optimal tariff also decreases in the strength of input-output linkages (measures as a reduction
in the exogenous parameter γ). The decline, however, is smaller when trade costs are larger.
Importantly, with input-output linkages, however, the optimal trade policy t is increasing
in real trade costs over a parameter range (γ, γ̄). The existence of γ̄ is a consequence of the
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Figure 5: Optimal non-cooperative trade policy




























Legend: We use the system of equilibrium conditions in equation (101) and the first-order condition to the non-
cooperative welfare maximization problem in equation (118) to numerically solve for the optimal trade policy t∗
in the absence of domestic policies and a foreign country that pursues free trade. We set σ = 2 (top diagram),
σ = 5 (bottom left diagram), and σ = 10 (bottom right diagram), and real trade costs δ = 1 (solid line) and δ = 1.6
(dashed line).
observations that at γ̃ where laissez-fare is optimal, the introduction of trade cost renders an
import tariff optimal, while for γ = 1, the optimal tariff is lower with trade costs than in their
absence. For small labor cost shares, the model is not well behaved (see also Caliendo et al.,
2017), so it is not always possible to observe γ; see for example the diagram with σ = 10.
Starting from γ = γ̄, a marginal increase in γ dampens the input distortion, calling for an
increase in the optimal tariff. This increase should be larger, the lower the trade costs (which
implies larger trade volumes). While for σ = 5, the critical labor cost share at which the
comparative statics result with respect to trade costs reverses, is γ̄ ≈ 0.4, for σ = 2 the critical
value is γ̄ ≈ 0.58.
We may summarize the result as follows:
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Proposition 10 (a) In a non-cooperative world with an input-output linkage, the optimal
trade policy is characterized by the system of equations in (101) and (118). (b) The optimal
tariff is lower than in a world without an input linkage. It turns into an import subsidy for
a sufficiently small labor cost share. (c) For labor cost shares in an intermediate range, the
optimal tariff is increasing and the optimal subsidy is decreasing in real trade costs.
Proof. Part (a) follows from the text. For part ( b), remember that the standard optimal tariff
analysis weighs the terms of trade externality against the welfare-cost of the tariff generated
by distorting the relative demand in favor of the imported intermediate. With the input dis-
tortion generated by the input-output linkage, the welfare cost of the tariff is aggravated by
increasing the price of the aggregate good, which now has a first-order welfare cost on ac-
count of raising the price of the material input in variety production. Incorporating this ef-
fect when deriving the optimal tariff a setting clearly results in a lower optimal tariff. For part
(c), recall that at γ = 1/(σ + 1) where laissez-fare is optimal, the introduction of trade costs
renders an import tariff optimal, while at γ = 1, the optimal tariff is decreasing in real trade
costs. This proves the existence of a critical γ̄ ∈ (γ̃, 1).
As Caliendo et al. (2017), we find that the traditional positive optimal-tariff argument can
be reversed, but for a different reason. They focus on a domestic entry distortion which is
already present in the absence of input-output linkages, but magnified by their presence and
by the presence of real trade costs. We carve out our argument in the absence of an entry
distortion and real trade costs and purely focus on the input distortion generated an input-
output linkage. We also demonstrate that in the presence of an input-output linkage, the
optimal tariff (import subsidy) might increase (decrease) in real trade costs, a comparative
static result that does not show up in Caliendo et al. (2017).
4 Summary and conclusions
Modern trade literature emphasizes that product differentiation is an important source of
consumer welfare, while firms gain from the availability of differentiated intermediate inputs.
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But product differentiation comes at the cost of market power and prices above marginal cost,
which in turn is a source of welfare loss. There is a voluminous literature addressing the vari-
ous distortions that the twin feature of market power and product differentiation may entail.
In general, the distortions arising from monopolistic competition are well understood. Most
of the literature focuses on environments of monopolistic competition. Oftentimes, it also
assumes an input-output linkage, meaning that production of differentiated goods uses ma-
terial inputs alongside primary inputs. In this paper we demonstrate that the combination
of monopolistic competition and input-output linkages gives rise to a distortion that has so
far mostly gone unnoticed. The reason is that markup pricing for goods means prices of ma-
terial inputs lie above their opportunity cost, which distorts the mix of material and primary
inputs. This causes a welfare loss over and above the potential loss deriving from distortions
highlighted by the existing literature.
We develop a stylized model that zooms in on this input distortion by assuming away
all other potential distortions deriving from monopolistic competition. In particular, we as-
sume a single sector and we model monopolistic competition based on the CES-version of
love of variety. Following existing literature, we model the input output linkage by means of a
Cobb-Douglas production function for differentiated varieties, using material inputs as well
as labor. This nests the simpler case without input-output linkage and allows us to explore
what the presence and strength of input-output linkages means for welfare and total factor
productivity. We first provide a full description of the social optimum for a closed economy
featuring imperfect competition in the presence of such an input-output linkage. In doing so,
we also analyze the optimal degree of roundaboutness in the use of labor through using out-
put as an intermediate input rather than direct consumption. The social optimum of a closed
economy presents a benchmark for our analysis of the production inefficiency caused by the
input-output linkage in a decentralized market equilibrium. It also establishes a reference
case against which we discuss the implications of trade in intermediate goods.
It is well known from the literature that the comparative statics of a monopolistic compe-
tition equilibrium much depends on whether or not the fixed cost relies on the same input
bundle as the variable cost. In our baseline case we assume that the fixed cost arises in the
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form of labor (the primary input), whereas the variable cost arises from both labor and ma-
terial inputs. In an extension, we allow for the input-output linkage to be present also in the
fixed cost. In the baseline case, markup pricing leaves the labor input as well as the number
of firms undistorted, relative to the social optimum, whereas the material input is used in
a less than optimal level which is also responsible for a suboptimally low degree of round-
aboutness. Importantly, these deviations from the social optimum generate a sizable welfare
loss. For plausible values of the key parameters, the welfare loss is in the vicinity of two to four
percent, relative to the first best. The loss in total factor productivity is even larger, between
10 and 20 percent. In the alternative case where the input-output linkage extends to the fixed
cost, we again find a distorted input mix, but this time it comes from a higher than optimal
labor use, relative to material inputs which are now first-best. Interestingly, in this case we
also find that there is a further channel through which the input distortion works out in the
decentralized equilibrium, which is a lower than optimal number of firms. This, in turn, is re-
sponsible for a magnified welfare loss, which for plausible parameter values lies between 10
and 20 percent. In a further extension, we allow for Melitz-type heterogeneity among firms.
It turns out that this does not alter our main results in any way.
What are suitable policies to address the input distortion? Intuitively, the first-best policy
is to subsidize material input use in production of differentiated varieties. In principle, subsi-
dizing production of differentiated varieties would also seem a suitable instrument to address
the distortion, but one expects this to be a second-best policy since it does not directly target
the distortion which lies with the input mix. We describe the decentralized market equilib-
rium simultaneously allowing for both of these policy instruments, and it turns out that they
are perfect substitutes for each other. The reason is that in the integrated world equilibrium
the output subsidy does not, in and of itself, involve any distortion. One would expect that
a wage tax is similarly able to address the input distortion. However, we demonstrate that
this is partial equilibrium intuition and that in general equilibrium the input-output linkage
implies the wage tax is fully passed on to the price of material input. Therefore, it is unable to
influence the input mix chosen by producers. Indeed, it turns out that in our stylized model
a wage tax simply doesn’t constitute a distortion and cannot, therefore, serve in offsetting the
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input distortion. The same applies for deviations from the benchmark model in the form of
wage setting environments, instead of a perfectly competitive labor market. An important
caveat here is that these conclusions would be altered in a model allowing for many sectors
and/or endogenous labor supply.
The most interesting implications of the input distortion arise in a trading environment
where countries have completely segmented labor markets and where trade is subject to
trade barriers. We look at the simple case of two symmetric countries that may trade in in-
termediate inputs. We readdress the question of optimal cooperative policies in two different
settings. The first is a setting where domestic subsidies and trade policies are available. In
this setting, it is optimal to subsidize domestic and imported varieties in the same way in or-
der avoid a distortion of relative import demand. The second is one where only trade policy
instruments are at the disposal of the policy makers. Absent any input-output linkage, in a co-
operative setting there would be no case for any trade policy intervention. With input-output
linkages, absent the above mentioned first-best policies, there is a case for a second-best use
of trade policy, which in this case is an import subsidy. This finding has important impli-
cations for optimal non-cooperative trade policy. The input distortion runs counter to the
standard terms-of-trade considerations, thereby calling for an import tariff that is smaller in
the standard setting, or for an import subsidy, even in the absence of multiple sectors.
Summing up, the general thrust of our paper is that the presence of input-output link-
ages in an environment of monopolistic competition establishes an economic rationale for
subsidizing producers relying on material inputs. Ideally the subsidy would target the input
distortion directly, but under plausible assumptions the distortion may be also addressed by
means of a production subsidy. In a framework that allows for trade policy interventions, the
thrust of our analysis is that the input distortion counteracts the terms-of-trade argument for
an import tariff and may even call for an import subsidy.
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A Empirical importance of input-output linkages
We use national input-output tables for Germany, France, the UK, the US, China, and South
Korea from the World input-output Database (WIOD) over the time period to compute share
of intermediate inputs in gross output. Let i denote a sector. For each year, country-level






gross outputi − value addedi
gross outputi
.
Figure 6 shows that the shares are substantial. At the country level, they range between around.
40 percent for the US, and a bit less than 60 percent for China. Moreover, there is not much
variation over time, although the period includes the year 2008, which may explain the drop
for the US at that time.



































2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Source: World Input Database (WIOD) - National Input-Output Tables
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B Detailed derivations
In this appendix, we show detailed derivations of the equations presented in section 4.2.
Domestic cost share and real wage. The price of a variety produced in country i and used
in country j inclusive of trade costs and the policy wedge emerges as p̃ij = δij (1 + tij) pi. The
price of the final good is P̃i =
(∑




. Unit demand in country





. The share of country j’s varieties in the





Nj (δji (1 + tji) pj)
1−σ∑
kNk (δki (1 + tki) pk)
1−σ =
N 11−σj δji (1 + tji) pj
P̃i
1−σ ,





. The domestic cost share (with δii = 1) emerges as
λii =
N 11−σi δii (1 + tii) pi
P̃i
1−σ = Ni (1 + tii)1−σ (µxi
P̃i
)1−σ























γ(σ−1) , where χ̄i := N
−1
i [µ (1 + tii)]
σ−1 .



























whereω := wh/wf denotes the relative wage. As policies do not affect the number of domestic
firms and countries are supposed to be symmetric in all dimensions but trade policy, χ̄h/χ̄f =
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1, and the expression simplifies to the one in the main text.
Value of aggregate domestic demand. We now establish a link between wage income wiLi
and the value of aggregate demand. Only differentiated good producers employ workers. The
total revenue of differentiated good producers amounts to Zi := Nipiqi. It is well known that
under monopolistic competition with zero profits, firms spend a constant share 1/σ of their
revenue on the fixed input and the remaining share 1 − 1/σ = 1/µ on the variable input into
the production, which requires labor and material input. The Cobb-Douglas technology as-
sumption implies that the cost share of material input amounts to 1−γ. Then, total payments





















where we have used optimal demand and employed the definition of the cost shares. Net
income is redistributed to households in a lump-sum fashion.
The final good is used by households and by differentiated good producers. Households
spend all their labor incomewiLi net of the lump-sum transfer Ti on the final good. As argued
above, differentiated good producers spend a share (1− γ) /µ of their revenues on the final
good. Then, the value of aggregate demand is given
P̃iQi = wiLi + Ti +
1− γ
µ

















Balanced trade. Balanced trade requires that Nfδfhqfhpf = Nhδhfqhfph, where the value of
trade flows is inclusive of trade costs and exclusive of the trade policy wedge. Using optimal
61
demand and the pricing rule, we obtain
Nfδfh
(






















































































System of equilibrium conditions and welfare. We define t̄ := thh = tff = thf and t := tfh.
Then, country h’s domestic cost share emerges as
λh =
Nh [(1 + t̄)xh]
1−σ
Nh [(1 + t̄)xh]








where the markup µ and the relative number of firms Nh/Nf disappeared due to the symme-





where the relative policy wedges disappeared to the uniformity assumption.
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Using again the definitions of t̄ and t, balanced trade and noting that cost share add to



































1 + t− t̄1+t1+t̄λh − t (1− λh)
=
(1− λf )wf









































t̄ (1 + t)λh + t (1 + t̄) (1− λh)
(1 + t) (1 + t̄)− t̄ (1 + t)λh − t (1 + t̄) (1− λh)
=
t̄ (1 + t)λh + t (1 + t̄) (1− λh)
(1 + t) (1 + t̄)− t̄ (1 + t)λh − t (1 + t̄) + t (1 + t̄)λh
=
t̄ (1 + t)λh + t (1 + t̄) (1− λh)
1 + t̄+ [t+ t̄t− t̄− t̄t]λh
=
t̄ (1 + t)λh + t (1 + t̄)− t (1 + t̄)λh
1 + t̄+ (t− t̄)λh
=
[t̄+ t̄t− t− t̄t]λh + t (1 + t̄)
1 + t̄+ (t− t̄)λh
=
(t̄− t)λh + t (1 + t̄)
1 + t̄+ (t− t̄)λh
=
t̄λh + t (1− λh + t̄)
1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh
Then, real income emerges as
Wh = ζh × (χ̄hλh)
− 1
γ(σ−1) , where ζh = 1 + κ
t̄λh + t (1− λh + t̄)
1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh
.
Equations in differentiated form. In differentiated form, the domestic cost shares read as
dλh
λh











+ (σ − 1) dω
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1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh
dt.




(1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh)
[




− (t̄λh + t (1− λh + t̄))
[
λh + (t− t̄) dλhdt
]
(1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh)2
= κ
(1 + t̄+ (t− t̄)λh)
[
(t̄− t) dλhdt + (1− λh + t̄)
]
− ((t̄− t)λh + t (1 + t̄))
[
λh + (t− t̄) dλhdt
]
(1 + t̄ (1− λh) + tλh)2
.
Deviations from symmetric equilibrium with t = t̄. Evaluated at a symmetric initial equil-
brium with t = t̄, we have
dλh
λh











+ (σ − 1) dω
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= κ (1− λ) ,
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where λ := λh = λf denotes the domestic cost share in the symmetric initial equilibrium.
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dt.

























































 (σ − 1) dt
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(σ − 1) (1− λ)
(
1−γ
γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
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At a symmetric equilibrium with t = t̄, the domestic multiplier reads as
ζh = 1 + κ
t̄λ+ t̄ (1− λ+ t̄)
1 + t̄ (1− λ) + t̄λ
= 1 + κt̄
1 + t̄
1 + t̄
= 1 + κt̄.












γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
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γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
)
.











γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
























− 1 + γ
=
γ









γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
=
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1−
1−γ
γ (1− λ)− (σ − 1)λ− (1− λ)
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
=
1−γ
γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− (1− λ)
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
> 0.
Evaluated at an initial symmetric free trade equilibrium, t̄ = 0, we have ζh = 1. The
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γ (1− λ) + (σ − 1)λ+ 1− λ
21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ψ
 ,
where in the absence of real cost cost, λ = 0.5, and 11−λ
dW/W
dt = κ −
1
2γ . Taking the derivative
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(1− 2 (1− λ))− 2
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21−γγ (1− λ) + 2 (σ − 1)λ+ 1
)2 ,






which implies that in the presence of trade costs (which cause the increase in λ), for γ =
1/ (σ + 1) an import tariff is welfare improving.
Optimal non-cooperative trade policy. Consider again the system of differentiated equi-
librium conditions and the differentiated income multiplier. We now set t̄ = 0 right from the
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dt.
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